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We consider the question of implementability of a social choice function in a classical setting where
the preferences of finitely many selfish individuals with private information have to be aggregated
towards a social choice. This is one of the central questions in mechanism design. If the concept of
weak implementation is considered, the Revelation Principle states that one can restrict attention to
truthful implementations and direct revelation mechanisms, which implies that implementability of
a social choice function is “easy” to check. For the concept of strong implementation, however, the
Revelation Principle becomes invalid, and the complexity of deciding whether a given social choice
function is strongly implementable has been open so far. In this paper, we show by using methods
from polyhedral theory that strong implementability of a social choice function can be decided in
polynomial space and that each of the payments needed for strong implementation can always be
chosen to be of polynomial encoding length. Moreover, we show that strong implementability of a
social choice function involving only a single selfish individual can be decided in polynomial time
via linear programming.
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1 Introduction
Mechanism design is a classical area of noncooperative game theory [7] and microeconomics [2] which
studies how privately known preferences of several people can be aggregated towards a social choice.
Applications include the design of voting procedures, the writing of contracts among parties, and the
construction of procedures for deciding upon public projects. Recently, the study of the Internet has
fostered the interest in algorithmic aspects of mechanism design [6].
In the classical social choice setting considered in this paper, there are n selfish agents, which must
make a collective decision from some finite set X of possible social choices. Each agent i has a private
value θi ∈Θi (called the agent’s type), which influences the preferences of all agents over the alternatives
in X . Formally, this is modeled by a valuation function Vi : X ×Θ → Q for each agent i, where Θ =
Θ1 × ·· · ×Θn. Every agent i reports some information si from a set Si of possible bids of i to the
mechanism designer who must then choose an alternative from X based on these bids. The goal of the
mechanism designer is to implement a given social choice function f : Θ→ X , that is, to make sure that
the alternative f (θ) is always chosen in equilibrium when the vector of true types is θ = (θ1, . . . ,θn). To
achieve this, the mechanism designer hands out a payment Pi(θ) to each agent i, which depends on the
bids. Each agent then tries to maximize the sum of her valuation and payment by choosing an appropriate
bid depending on her type. A mechanism Γ = (S1, . . . ,Sn,g,P) is defined by the sets S1, . . . ,Sn of possible
bids of the agents, an outcome function g : S1×·· ·×Sn → X , and the payment scheme P = (P1, . . . ,Pn).
In the most common concept called weak implementation, the mechanism Γ is said to implement
the social choice function f if some (Bayesian) equilibrium of the noncooperative game defined by the
mechanism yields the outcome specified by f . An important result known as the Revelation Principle (cf.
2 Complexity of Strong Implementability
[2, p. 884]) states that a social choice function is weakly implementable if and only if it can be truthfully
implemented by a direct revelation mechanism, which means that f can be implemented by a mechanism
with Si = Θi for all i and truthful reporting as an equilibrium that yields the outcome specified by f . As
a result, the question whether there exists a mechanism that weakly implements a given social choice
function f can be easily answered in time polynomial in |Θ| by checking for negative cycles in complete
directed graphs on the agents’ type spaces with changes of valuations as edge weights (cf. [4]).
However, there is an obvious drawback in considering weak implementation: Although a mecha-
nism Γ may have some equilibrium that yields the outcome specified by f , there may be other equilibria
that yield different outcomes. Thus, the concept of weak implementation heavily relies on the implicit
assumption that the agents always play the equilibrium that the mechanism designer wants if there is
more than one.
The standard way to avoid this problem is to consider the more robust concept of implementation
called strong implementation. A mechanism Γ is said to strongly implement the social choice function f
if every equilibrium of Γ yields the outcome specified by f . For strong implementation, the Revela-
tion Principle does not hold, so one cannot, in general, restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms
and truthful implementations when trying to decide whether a social choice function is strongly imple-
mentable. In tackling the question whether a given social choice function can be strongly implemented,
it is not even a priori clear that one can restrict attention to finite sets Si or polynomially sized payments.
Thus, to the best of our knowledge, the complexity has been open so far. The main result of this paper is
that strong implementability of a social choice function can be decided in polynomial space. In particu-
lar, if a social choice function can be strongly implemented, our results show that each of the payments
in a mechanism that strongly implements it can be chosen to be of polynomial encoding length. It seems
unlikely that the problem is contained in NP, at least the characterizations of strong implementability
developed so far require an exponential number of (polynomially sized) certificates. We conjecture that
deciding strong implementability is in fact PSPACE-complete. However, we show that the problem can
be solved in polynomial time in case of a single agent.
Problem Definition We are given n agents identified with the set N = {1, . . . ,n} and a finite set X
of possible social choices. For each agent i, there is a finite set Θi of possible types and we write
Θ = Θ1 × ·· · ×Θn. The true type θi of agent i is known only to the agent herself. However, there
is a commonly known probability distribution p : Θ → Q on Θ satisfying p(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ and
∑θ∈Θ p(θ) = 1. Thus, every agent knows the probabilities of all possible vectors θ ∈ Θ of types of all
agents. Without loss of generality, we assume the marginal probability pi(θi) := ∑θ−i∈Θ−i p(θ−i,θi) to be
strictly positive for every θi ∈Θi. The beliefs of an agent i of type θi are then given by the (conditioned)
probability distribution qi(.|θi) over Θ−i defined by
qi(θ−i|θi) :=
p(θ−i,θi)
pi(θi)
.
All agents as well as the mechanism designer know these beliefs for every i and every θi since they know
the probability distribution p. However, as mentioned above, only agent i knows the true value of θi.
Each agent i has a valuation function Vi : X ×Θ →Q, where Vi(x,θ) specifies the value that agent i
assigns to alternative x ∈ X when the types of the agents are θ ∈ Θ. A social choice function in this
setting is a function f : Θ → X that assigns an alternative f (θ) ∈ X to every vector θ of types.
Definition 1. A mechanism Γ = (S1, . . . ,Sn,g,P) consists of a set Si of possible bids for each agent i,
an outcome function g : S → X and a payment scheme P : S → Qn, where S := S1 × ·· · × Sn. Γ is
called a direct revelation mechanism if Si = Θi for all i ∈ N. We denote the direct revelation mecha-
nism (Θ1, . . . ,Θn, f ,P) defined by a social choice function f and a payment scheme P by Γ( f ,P).
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A strategy for agent i in the mechanism Γ is a function αi : Θi → Si that defines a bid αi(θi) ∈ Si for
every possible type θi of agent i. A strategy profile (in the mechanism Γ) is an n-tuple α = (α1, . . .αn)
containing a strategy αi for each agent i.
Definition 2. Given a mechanism Γ = (S1, . . . ,Sn,g,P) and an (n− 1)-tuple α−i of strategies for all
agents except i, the expected utility from a bid si ∈ Si for agent i when her type is θi is defined as
UΓi (α−i,si|θi) := ∑θ−i∈Θ−i qi(θ−i|θi) ·
(
Vi(g(α−i(θ−i),si),θ)+Pi(α−i(θ−i),si)
)
The strategy profile α = (α1, . . . ,αn) is a (Bayesian) equilibrium of Γ if αi(θi) maximizes the expected
utility of an agent i of type θi for every i ∈ N and every θi ∈Θi, i.e., if αi(θi) ∈ argmaxsi∈Si UΓi (α−i,si|θi)for all i ∈ N,θi ∈ Θi. A direct revelation mechanism Γ( f ,P) is called incentive compatible if truthful
reporting is an equilibrium.
Note that incentive compatibility of a mechanism is often defined as the property that truthful report-
ing is a dominant strategy equilibrium. However, since we consider Bayesian equilibria, the definition
given above is the natural choice in our setting.
Definition 3. The mechanism Γ = (S1, . . . ,Sn,g,P) strongly implements the social choice function f if
1. Γ has at least one equilibrium,
2. Every equilibrium α of Γ satisfies g◦α = f .
The social choice function f is called strongly implementable if there exists a mechanism Γ that strongly
implements f .
Definition 4 (Strong Implementability Problem).
INSTANCE: The number n of agents, the set X of possible social choices, the sets Θi of possible
types of the agents, the valuation functions Vi : X ×Θ → Q, the probability distribu-
tion p over Θ, and the social choice function f : Θ→ X.
QUESTION: Is f strongly implementable?
To encode an instance of Strong Implementability, we need to do the following: For every valuation
function Vi : X ×Θ→Q, we need to store |X | · |Θ| rational numbers. For the probability distribution p :
Θ → Q, we need to store |Θ| nonnegative rational numbers. The social choice function f : Θ → X has
encoding length |Θ| · log(|X |). Thus, the encoding length of an instance of Strong Implementability is in
Ω(|X | · |Θ| ·n).
Observe that, in general, the encoding length is exponential in the number n of agents, since, even
when each agent has just two possible types, we have |Θ| = 2n. It remains an interesting question for
future research to study the problem and its complexity if the valuation functions Vi, the probability
distribution p, and the social choice function f are not explicitly specified but can only be accessed
via an oracle. In this case, one would be interested in the existence/non-existence of oracle-polynomial
time/space algorithms. We conjecture that exponential lower bounds can be proved in this setting.
2 Solvability in Polynomial Space
In this section, we show that Strong Implementability is contained in the complexity class PSPACE. One
of the key ingredients of our argumentation is a result due to Mookherjee and Reichelstein [3] called the
Augmented Revelation Principle. The mechanism design setting considered in [3] is similar to ours. The
proof of the Augmented Revelation Principle given in [3] is focused on the case where no payments are
allowed in a mechanism. We now give a proof for our setting of mechanisms with payments.
4 Complexity of Strong Implementability
Definition 5. A mechanism Γ=(S1, . . . ,Sn,g,P) is called augmented revelation mechanism if Si =Θi∪Ti
for all i ∈ N and arbitrary sets Ti.
In the above definition, the elements of the set Ti represent additional bids available to agent i, in
addition to her possible types.
Theorem 1 (The Augmented Revelation Principle).
If a social choice function f : Θ → X is strongly implementable, then f can be strongly implemented by
an augmented revelation mechanism in which truthful reporting is an equilibrium.
Proof. Let Γ = (S1, . . . ,Sn,g,P) strongly implement f . We construct an augmented revelation mecha-
nism ¯Γ = ( ¯S1, . . . , ¯Sn, g¯, ¯P) that strongly implements f as in the original proof of the Augmented Revela-
tion Principle in [3]. However, we additionally have to define the new payment scheme ¯P in terms of the
given payment scheme P. Given an arbitrary equilibrium α = (α1, . . . ,αn) of Γ, we define ¯Si := Θi∪Ti,
where
Ti := {si ∈ Si |si /∈ image(αi)}
and image(αi) = {αi(θi) |θi ∈ Θi} denotes the image of the function αi : Θi → Si. We consider the
functions φi : ¯Si → Si given by
φi(s¯i) :=
{
αi(θi) if s¯i = θi for θi ∈ Θi
s¯i if s¯i ∈ Ti
and define the outcome function g¯ : ¯S→ X as g¯ := g◦φ , where φ = (φ1, . . . ,φn). The payment scheme ¯P :
¯S →Q is defined analogously as ¯P := P◦φ .
To show that ¯Γ strongly implements f , suppose that α¯ = (α¯1, . . . , α¯n) is an equilibrium of ¯Γ and
consider the the strategy profile α∗ = (α∗1 , . . . ,α∗n ) in Γ given by α∗i := φi ◦ α¯i. By definition of α∗, g¯,
and ¯P we then have g ◦α∗ = g ◦ φ ◦ α¯ = g¯ ◦ α¯ and P ◦α∗ = P ◦ φ ◦ α¯ = ¯P ◦ α¯ . We claim that α∗ is
an equilibrium of Γ. Since every φi : ¯Si → Si is surjective, we can choose, for every fixed si ∈ Si, an
element s¯i ∈ ¯Si with φi(s¯i) = si. Then, for every i ∈ N and every possible θi ∈ Θi, we have
UΓi (α∗−i,α∗i (θi)|θi) = ∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i|θi)
(
Vi(g(α∗(θ)),θ)+Pi(α∗(θ))
)
= ∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i|θi)
(
Vi(g¯(α¯(θ)),θ)+ ¯Pi(α¯(θ))
)
≥ ∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i|θi)
(
Vi(g¯(α¯−i(θ−i), s¯i),θ)+ ¯Pi(α¯−i(θ−i), s¯i)
)
= ∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i|θi)
(
Vi(g(α∗−i(θ−i),φi(s¯i)),θ)+Pi(α∗−i(θ−i),φi(s¯i))
)
= ∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i|θi)
(
Vi(g(α∗−i(θ−i),si),θ)+Pi(α∗−i(θ−i),si)
)
= UΓi (α∗−i,si|θi)
where the inequality follows since α¯ is an equilibrium of ¯Γ. Since si ∈ Si was arbitrary, this shows that α∗
is an equilibrium of Γ as claimed. So since Γ strongly implements f , it follows that f = g◦α∗= g¯◦α¯ , i.e.,
the equilibrium α¯ yields the outcome specified by f . Hence, it just remains to show that truthful bidding
is an equilibrium of ¯Γ. But this follows easily since, for every θ ∈ Θ, we have g¯(θ) = (g ◦ φ)(θ) =
g(α(θ)) and ¯P(θ) = (P◦φ)(θ) = P(α(θ)) and α is an equilibrium of Γ.
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We can now proceed analogously to [3] to show how the Augmented Revelation Principle can be used
to obtain a necessary condition for strong implementability of a social choice function. Mookherjee and
Reichelstein already proved that this condition is sufficient for mechanisms with payments, so we will in
fact obtain a necessary and sufficient condition in our setting. Note, however, that the sufficiency result
does not hold for mechanisms without payments. To formulate our necessary and sufficient condition for
strong implementability, we need the following definitions:
Definition 6. An equilibrium α = (α1, . . . ,αn) in a direct revelation mechanism Γ( f ,P) can be selectively
eliminated if there exist an agent i ∈ N and functions h : Θ−i → X and ¯Pi : Θ−i →Q such that:
1. for some ¯θi ∈ Θi: ∑θ−i∈Θ−i qi(θ−i| ¯θi) ·
(
Vi(h(α−i(θ−i)),θ−i, ¯θi)+ ¯Pi(α−i(θ−i))
)
> ∑θ−i∈Θ−i qi(θ−i| ¯θi) ·
(
Vi( f (α−i(θ−i),αi( ¯θi)),θ−i, ¯θi)+Pi(α−i(θ−i),αi( ¯θi))
)
2. for all θi ∈ Θi: ∑θ−i∈Θ−i qi(θ−i|θi) ·
(
Vi( f (θ),θ)+Pi(θ)−Vi(h(θ−i),θ)− ¯Pi(θ−i)
)
≥ 0
In this definition, agent i is given a new bid, which we will call a flag. When agent i bids the flag
and the other agents bid a vector θ−i ∈ Θ−i, the mechanism chooses the outcome h(θ−i) and hands out
the payment ¯Pi(θ−i) to agent i. The first condition says that, for some type ¯θi ∈ Θi, agent i can increase
her expected utility by deviating from αi to the flag. Thus, α is not an equilibrium anymore. However,
the second condition ensures that agent i can not increase her expected utility by deviating from truthful
reporting to the flag in the case that all other agents bid their true types. Hence, truthful reporting is
preserved as an equilibrium.
Definition 7. An equilibrium α of the direct revelation mechanism Γ( f ,P) is called bad if f ◦α 6= f . The
direct revelation mechanism Γ( f ,P) satisfies the selective elimination condition if every bad equilibrium α
can be selectively eliminated.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the social choice function f : Θ → X is strongly implementable. Then there
exists an incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism Γ( f ,P) that satisfies the selective elimination
condition.
Proof. By Theorem 1, there exists an augmented revelation mechanism Γ=(S1, . . . ,Sn,g,P) that strongly
implements f and in which truthful reporting is an equilibrium. In particular, this implies that g|Θ = f .
We now show that the direct revelation mechanism Γ( f ,P|Θ) is incentive compatible and satisfies the selec-
tive elimination condition. Incentive compatibility follows directly from the fact that truthful reporting
is an equilibrium in Γ. Moreover, any bad equilibrium α of Γ( f ,P|Θ) can not be an equilibrium of Γ
since this would contradict the fact that Γ strongly implements f . Hence, in Γ there must be a non-type
message available to some agent i to which i prefers to deviate when α is being played, without being
tempted to do the same when all agents report truthfully. Thus, any bad equilibrium α can be selectively
eliminated.
Mookherjee and Reichelstein [3] already proved that the condition from Theorem 2 is also sufficient
for strong implementability of a social choice function f in settings where payments are allowed. The
idea of the proof is to start with an incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism and eliminate the
finitely many bad equilibria one after another in order to obtain an augmented revelation mechanism
that strongly implements f . However, one has to make sure that the augmentations do not induce new
(bad) equilibria. This is done by giving additional bids (called counterflags) to some agent j 6= i to make
sure that the newly introduced flag of agent i can never be used in an equilibrium. To achieve this, the
payment scheme has to be modified appropriately. Together with Theorem 2, the result of Mookherjee
and Reichelstein [3] proves:
6 Complexity of Strong Implementability
Theorem 3. The social choice function f : Θ→ X is strongly implementable if and only if there exists an
incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism Γ( f ,P) that satisfies the selective elimination condition.
Theorem 3 is one of the keys to proving that the Strong Implementability Problem is in PSPACE (in
fact, our proof shows that the problem is in NPSPACE, which equals PSPACE by Savitch’s Theorem).
The idea of our proof is to use the direct revelation mechanism Γ( f ,P) and, for every bad equilibrium α
of Γ( f ,P), the index i, the pair of functions (h, ¯Pi), and the type ¯θi needed to selectively eliminate α , as
a certificate for showing that f is strongly implementable. The algorithm first guesses the polynomially
many values Pi(θ) and then enumerates all possible strategy profiles α to check which are good or
bad equilibria. If a bad equilibrium α is found, the algorithm guesses the data (i,h, ¯Pi, ¯θi) needed to
selectively eliminate α . However, in order to be able to run this algorithm in polynomial space, we have
to prove that the certificates used in each step can be chosen to have only polynomial encoding length.
In particular, we need to show that every value Pi(θ) of the payment functions and every value ¯Pi(θ−i)
can be chosen to have polynomial encoding length.
Theorem 4. The social choice function f : Θ → X is strongly implementable if and only if there exists
an incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism Γ( f ,P) of polynomial encoding length that satisfies
the selective elimination condition. In this case, for every (fixed) bad equilibrium α , the data (i,h, ¯Pi, ¯θi)
needed to selectively eliminate α can be chosen to have polynomial encoding length.
Note that Theorem 3 implies that, in order to prove the if and only if statement in the claim, we just
have to prove that strong implementability of a social choice function f : Θ→ X implies the existence of
a direct revelation mechanism with the given properties.
So assume that the social choice function f is strongly implementable. Then, by Theorem 3, there
exists an incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism Γ( f ,P) (of possibly more than polynomial
encoding length) that satisfies the selective elimination condition. For each bad equilibrium α of Γ( f ,P),
we denote an index i, functions h : Θ−i → X and ¯Pi : Θ−i → Q, and a type ¯θi ∈ Θi that can be used to
selectively eliminate α by iα ,hα , ¯Pαiα , and ¯θ
α
iα , respectively. Similarly, for every strategy profile α that is
not an equilibrium, we denote an index i and a pair (θi, ¯θi) of types of agent i such that UΓi (α−i, ¯θi|θi)>
UΓi (α−i,αi(θi)|θi) by iα and (θαiα , ¯θ
α
iα ), respectively.
Note that the only part of the mechanism Γ( f ,P) that could have more than polynomial encod-
ing length is the payment scheme P : Θ → Qn, and, for every bad equilibrium α , the only part of
the data (iα ,hα , ¯Pαiα , ¯θ
α
iα ) that could have more than polynomial encoding length is the function ¯P
α
iα :
Θ−iα → Q. Hence, we only have to show that every value Pi(θ) of the payment functions and every
value ¯Pαiα (θ−iα ) can be chosen to have polynomial encoding length.
To do so, we assume that we are given iα ,hα , and ¯θαiα for every bad equilibrium α of Γ( f ,P), and
iα , (θαiα , ¯θ
α
iα ) for every strategy profile α that is not an equilibrium and consider the system of linear
inequalities in the variables Pi(θ), ¯Pαiα (θ−iα ), for θ ∈ Θ, θ−iα ∈ Θ−iα , displayed on page 7.
Here, the inequalities (1) and (2) encode exactly which strategy profiles are equilibria of Γ( f ,P) and
(3), (4) correspond to conditions 1. and 2. in the definition of selective elimination of an equilibrium,
respectively. Note that the number of inequalities and variables of the system is exponential in the size
of the input of Strong Implementability. However, we know that the system has a solution given by the
values Pi(θ), ¯Pαiα (θ−iα ) given by the mechanism Γ( f ,P) and the functions ¯P
α
iα specified by the selective
elimination condition for the bad equilibria of Γ( f ,P). Theorem 4 now follows immediately if we can
prove the following result:
Proposition 1. The system of inequalities has a solution in which each component has polynomial en-
coding length.
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For all strategy profiles α that are not equilibria:
∑
θ−iα∈Θ−iα
qiα (θ−iα |θαiα ) ·
(
Viα ( f (α−iα (θ−iα ), ¯θαiα ),θ−iα ,θαiα )+Piα(α−iα (θ−iα ), ¯θαiα )
)
− ∑
θ−iα∈Θ−iα
qiα (θ−iα |θαiα ) ·
(
Viα ( f (α−iα (θ−iα ),αiα (θαiα )),θ−iα ,θαiα )+Piα(α−iα (θ−iα ),αiα (θαiα ))
)
> 0 (1)
For all equilibria α and all i ∈ N, θi, ˜θi ∈ Θi:
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i|θi) ·
(
Vi( f (α−i(θ−i),αi(θi)),θ−i,θi)+Pi(α−i(θ−i),αi(θi))
)
− ∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i|θi) ·
(
Vi( f (α−i(θ−i), ˜θi),θ−i,θi)+Pi(α−i(θ−i), ˜θi)
)
≥ 0 (2)
For all bad equilibria α :
∑
θ−iα∈Θ−iα
qiα (θ−iα | ¯θαiα ) ·
(
Viα (hα(α−iα (θ−iα )),θ−iα , ¯θαiα )+ ¯P
α
iα (α−iα (θ−iα ))
)
− ∑
θ−iα∈Θ−iα
qiα (θ−iα | ¯θαiα ) ·
(
Viα ( f (α−iα (θ−iα ),αiα ( ¯θαiα )),θ−iα , ¯θiα )+Piα(α−iα (θ−iα ),αiα ( ¯θαiα ))
)
> 0 (3)
For all bad equilibria α and all θiα ∈Θiα :
∑
θ−iα∈Θ−iα
qiα (θ−iα |θiα ) ·
(
Viα ( f (θ−iα ,θiα ),θ−iα ,θiα )+Piα (θ−iα ,θiα )−Viα (hα(θ−iα ),θ−iα ,θiα )− ¯Pαiα (θ−iα )
)
≥ 0 (4)
8 Complexity of Strong Implementability
We let P denote the polyhedron defined by this system of inequalities when all strict inequalities are
replaced by non-strict inequalities. In other words, P is the topological closure of the set of solutions of
the system. We denote the number of bad equilibria by p∈N, the number of strategy profiles that are not
equilibria by q ∈ N, and the total number of equilibria by m ∈ N. Then, by multiplying all inequalities
by −1 and rearranging, we can write P as
P = {(x,y) ∈ Rn·|Θ|×Rl : Ax+By≤ b},
where the vector x ∈ Rn·|Θ| represents the n · |Θ| variables Pi(θ) and the vector y ∈ Rl represents the
l := ∑α bad equ. |Θ−iα | variables ¯Pαiα (θ−iα ).
A ∈ Mat(k× n · |Θ|,Q) and B ∈ Mat(k× l,Q) are the matrices given by the coefficients of the vari-
ables Pi(θ) and ¯Pαiα (θ−iα ) in the system, respectively, where k := q+m ·∑ni=1 |Θi|2 + p+∑α bad equ. |Θiα |
is the total number of inequalities in the system. The vector b ∈Qk is given by the constant terms in the
system, which are all (sums of) products of valuations and probabilities. In particular, each entry of the
matrices A, B, and of the vector b is of polynomial encoding length.
On our way to proving Proposition 1 and Theorem 4, we use some definitions and results from
polyhedral theory. In particular, we use the fact that the vertex and facet complexity of a polyhedron
are polynomially related to each other (see, e.g., [1]). The most common use in our context will be to
conclude that if each inequality in a linear system (with potentially exponentially many inequalities) has
polynomial encoding length, then there exists a solution of polynomial encoding length. We also use the
property that the encoding length of the sum of 2poly(n) many values xi ∈ Q is bounded by a polynomial
in poly(n) and the encoding sizes of the xi.
Definition 8. The projection of a polyhedron P ⊆ Rn×Rm to Rn is defined as
projRn(P) := {x ∈ Rn : (x,y) ∈ P for some y ∈ Rm}.
By standard results from polyhedral theory (cf. [5]), the projection of the polyhedron P , which is
the closure of the set of solutions of our system of linear inequalities, to Rn·|Θ| can be written as
projRn·|Θ|(P) := {x ∈ Rn·|Θ| : rTλ (b−Ax)≥ 0 for all λ ∈ Λ},
where {rλ}λ∈Λ := extreme. rays(Q) is the finite set of extreme rays of the polyhedron Q := {v ∈ Rk+ :
vT B = 0}. In particular, projRn·|Θ|(P) is a polyhedron.
Lemma 1. Let P1 ⊆ Rn and P2 ⊆Rm be polyhedra and P = P1×P2.Then
extreme. rays(P) = extreme. rays(P1)× extreme. rays(P2).
Lemma 2. Let Kri denote the relative interior of a convex set K. If P ⊆ Rn ×Rm is a polyhedron,
then projRn(P)ri = projRn(Pri). Moreover, if P = P1 ×P2 for polyhedra P1 ⊆ Rn and P2 ⊆ Rm, then
Pri = Pri1 ×P
ri
2 .
The following proposition is crucial for the proof of Proposition 1. We use ker(C) to denote the
kernel {z : Cz = 0} of a matrix C.
Proposition 2. Each entry of an extreme ray rλ of the polyhedron Q has encoding length polynomial in
the input size of the Strong Implementability Problem.
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Proof. Q can be written as Q = {v ∈Rk+ : BT v = 0}= ker(BT )∩Rk+, where the matrix BT has the form
BT =


BT1 0
BT2
0 . . .
BTp−1
0 BTp


=
(
0 ˜B
) (5)
Here, B j ∈ Mat((1+ |Θiα j |)× |Θ−iα j |,Q) is the coefficient matrix of the |Θ−iα j | variables ¯P
α j
iα j
(θ−iα j ),
θ−iα j ∈ Θ−iα j , for the bad equilibrium α j in the inequalities (3) and (4) corresponding to α j. Hence, we
can write Q as
Q = Rq+m·∑ni=1 |Θi|2+ ×
(
ker( ˜B)∩Rp+∑α bad equ. |Θiα |+
)
where ˜B ∈ Mat(l × (p +∑α bad equ. |Θiα |),Q) is the submatrix of BT obtained by deleting the q +m ·
∑ni=1 |Θi|2 zeros at the beginning of each line as shown in (5). Hence, by Lemma 1, every extreme ray rλ
of Q is of the form rλ = (ei,r), where ei is a unit vector in Rq+m·∑ni=1 |Θi|2 (which are the extreme rays of
R
q+m·∑ni=1 |Θi|2
+ ) and r is an extreme ray of ker( ˜B)∩R
p+∑α bad equ. |Θiα |
+ .
To obtain a description of the extreme rays of ker( ˜B)∩Rp+∑α bad equ. |Θiα |+ , note that ˜B is the direct sum
of the matrices BT1 , . . . ,BTp , so we have
ker( ˜B)∩Rp+∑α bad equ. |Θiα |+ =
p⊕
j=1
(
ker(BTj )∩R
1+|Θiα j |
+
)
.
Thus, again by Lemma 1, every extreme ray rλ of Q is of the form rλ = (ei,r1, . . . ,rp), where ei is a
unit vector in Rq+m·∑ni=1 |Θi|2 and r j ∈ R
1+|Θiα j | is an extreme ray of Q j := ker(BTj )∩R
1+|Θiα j |
+ for every
j = 1, . . . , p. Hence, it just remains to show that, for every j = 1, . . . , p, each entry of an extreme ray r j
of Q j has polynomial encoding length. This follows by writing Q j = {v ∈ R
1+|Θiα j |
+ : BTj v = 0} and the
fact that the encoding length of B j is polynomial for every j.
Proposition 3. The facet complexity of projRn·|Θ|(P) is polynomial in the encoding length of the input of
Strong Implementability.
Proof. As already stated, we have
projRn·|Θ|(P) = {x ∈ Rn·|Θ| : rTλ (b−Ax)≥ 0 for all λ ∈ Λ}
= {x ∈ Rn·|Θ| : (rTλ A)x ≤ r
T
λ b for all λ ∈ Λ}
where extreme. rays(Q) = {rλ}λ∈Λ is the finite set of extreme rays of Q. Hence, the claim follows if
we show that each inequality (rTλ A)x ≤ r
T
λ b is of polynomial encoding length. To this end, consider
the inequality (rTλ A)x ≤ r
T
λ b for a fixed λ ∈ Λ. By Proposition 2, each entry of the extreme ray rλ
has polynomial encoding length. Since each entry of b has polynomial encoding length as well, the
value rTλ b ∈ Q is a sum of exponentially many values of polynomial encoding length, which is again of
polynomial encoding length. Similarly, since each entry of the matrix A has polynomial encoding length,
each entry of the vector rTλ A has polynomial encoding length, which implies that the whole vector r
T
λ A
is of polynomial encoding length since the vector is of polynomial size. Thus, the encoding length of
(rTλ A)x ≤ r
T
λ b is polynomial.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Let eq(P) (the equality set of P) denote the set of indices of inequalities in
Ax+By ≤ b that are satisfied with equality for all points in P . It is enough to prove the existence
of a point (x¯, y¯) in P ri such that each component of (x¯, y¯) has polynomial encoding length: Such a
point (x¯, y¯) has to satisfy all inequalities with indices not in eq(P) with strict inequality. Moreover,
since the original system (where the inequalities (1) and (3) are strict) has a solution, we know that all
indices of the inequalities (1) and (3) are not in eq(P). Hence, (x¯, y¯) satisfies all the inequalities (1) and
(3) with strict inequality, i.e., it is a solution of the original system.
By Proposition 3, projRn·|Θ|(P) is a nonempty polyhedron of polynomial facet complexity. Using
standard results from polyhedral theory (cf. [1, Thm. 6.5.5]), this implies the existence of a point x¯
of polynomial encoding length in projRn·|Θ|(P)ri. In particular, each component of x¯ has polynomial
encoding length. Moreover, by Lemma 2, we have x¯ ∈ projRn·|Θ|(P ri), so we can choose y0 ∈ Rl such
that (x¯,y0) ∈ P ri, i.e., y0 is a solution of the system Ax¯+By ≤ b ⇔ By ≤ b−Ax¯ and all inequalities
with indices not in eq(P) are satisfied strictly for y = y0. Writing ˜P := {y ∈ Rl : By ≤ b−Ax¯}, we
have eq( ˜P) = eq(P): The inclusion eq( ˜P) ⊇ eq(P) follows from the definition of ˜P and the other
inclusion follows since y0 ∈ ˜P satisfies all inequalities with indices not in eq(P) with strict inequality.
The matrix B has the form
B =


0 0 0 0
B1 0
B2
.
.
.
0 Bp


.
Hence, the system By≤ b−Ax¯ decomposes into p smaller systems B jy j ≤ b j−A jx¯ j, j = 1, . . . , p, where
b j,A j, x¯ j denote the parts of b,A and x¯, respectively, corresponding to the lines of the system containing
the submatrix B j. Writing
˜P j := {y j ∈R
|Θ−iα j | : B jy j ≤ b j −A jx¯ j},
we have ˜P = ˜P1×·· ·× ˜Pp, and each ˜P j is nonempty because ˜P is nonempty.
Since B j ∈ Mat((1+ |Θiα j |)× |Θ−iα j |) is of polynomial size for every j, and each entry of A,B,b,
and x¯ has polynomial encoding length, the facet complexity of each polyhedron ˜P j is polynomial. Thus,
again by standard results from polyhedral theory, the relative interior of each ˜P j contains a point y˜ j of
polynomial encoding length.
If we now define y¯ := (y˜1, . . . , y˜p), all components of the vector (x¯, y¯) have polynomial encoding
length and we have y¯ ∈ ˜P ri1 ×·· ·× ˜P rip = ˜P ri, where the equality follows by Lemma 2. Hence, (x¯, y¯)
satisfies Ax¯+By¯ ≤ b and all inequalities with indices not in eq( ˜P) = eq(P) are satisfied with strict
inequality, i.e., (x¯, y¯) ∈P ri.
Theorem 5. Strong Implementability ∈ PSPACE.
Proof. Assume that the given social choice function f is strongly implementable. Then, by Theorem 4,
there exists an incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism Γ( f ,P) of polynomial encoding length
that satisfies the selective elimination condition. Moreover, for every bad equilibrium α of Γ( f ,P), the
data (iα ,hα , ¯Pαiα , ¯θ
α
iα ) needed to selectively eliminate α can also be chosen to have polynomial encoding
length. Now consider Algorithm 1 on the following page for verifying that f is strongly implementable.
Since all the values Pi(θ) and the data (iα ,hα , ¯Pαiα , ¯θ
α
iα ) for every bad equilibrium α have polynomial
encoding length and every inequality in the system is of polynomial encoding length, Algorithm 1 uses
only polynomial space, which proves the claim.
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Algorithm 1.
1. Guess the (polynomially many) values Pi(θ).
2. For every strategy profile α = (α1, . . .αn) in the mechanism Γ( f ,P) do:
• Check whether α is an equilibrium by going through the inequalities (2) corresponding to
α one by one.
• If α is not an equilibrium, we have already found (iα ,θαiα , ¯θαiα ) such that the inequality (1)
corresponding to α is satisfied in the previous step.
• If α is an equilibrium, check whether f ◦α = f by going through all possible bid vec-
tors θ ∈ Θ. If f ◦α 6= f , guess the data (iα ,hα , ¯Pαiα , ¯θαiα ) of polynomial encoding length
needed to selectively eliminate α and check the inequalities (3) and (4) corresponding to
α one by one.
As a byproduct of Theorem 4, we obtain the following result on the size of the payments needed to
strongly implement a social choice function:
Corollary 1. If the social choice function f : Θ→ X is strongly implementable, it can be strongly imple-
mented by an augmented revelation mechanism Γ = (S1, . . . ,Sn,g,P) in which each payment Pi(s), s ∈ S,
i ∈ N, has polynomial encoding length.
Proof. If f is strongly implementable, Theorem 4 implies the existence of an incentive compatible direct
revelation mechanism Γ′( f ,P′) of polynomial encoding length that satisfies the selective elimination condi-
tion and, for every bad equilibrium α of Γ′( f ,P′), the data (iα ,h
α , ¯Pαiα , ¯θ
α
iα ) needed to selectively eliminate
α can also be chosen to have polynomial encoding length. In particular, all payments and “elimination
payments” ¯Pαiα are of polynomial encoding length. As shown in the proof of the sufficiency part of Theo-
rem 3 given in [3], we can then obtain an augmented revelation mechanism as in the claim from Γ′( f ,P′) by
a sequence of at most |Θ||Θ| ≤ 2|Θ|2 augmentations. In each step, one of the at most |Θ||Θ| bad equilibria
is eliminated without introducing any new equilibria. The payments after each augmentation are given
by the ¯Pαiα and the payments from the previous step, which are only changed by additive terms of poly-
nomial encoding length. Since there are at most |Θ||Θ| ≤ 2|Θ|2 augmentation steps and each of the initial
payments in Γ′( f ,P′) is also of polynomial encoding length, this implies that each payment Pi(s) in the final
augmented revelation mechanism that strongly implements f is of polynomial encoding length.
3 The Single-Agent Scenario
In this section, we show that, in the case of a single agent, Strong Implementability can be decided in
polynomial time via linear programming.
Definition 9. Given a single-agent mechanism Γ = (S,g,P) and a type θ ∈ Θ of the agent, the utility
from a bid s ∈ S for the agent is defined as UΓ(s|θ) := V (g(s),θ)+P(s). A strategy α : Θ → S of the
agent in the mechanism Γ is an equilibrium strategy (or simply an equilibrium) if α(θ) maximizes the
utility of the agent for every θ ∈ Θ, i.e., if UΓ(α(θ)|θ) ≥UΓ(s¯|θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, s¯ ∈ S.
Note that this definition is just the special case of Definition 2 where there is only a single agent.
Incentive compatibility of a direct revelation mechanism and strong implementation of a social choice
function are defined as before. The Strong Implementability Problem for a single agent (Single-Agent
Strong Implementability) is simply the special case of the Strong Implementability Problem with the
number n of agents equal to one. Note that the probability distribution p is not needed for a single agent.
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As Single-Agent Strong Implementability is a special case of Strong Implementability, the character-
ization from Theorem 3 holds in the single-agent scenario as well. However, the definition of selective
elimination implies that, with just one agent, selective elimination of a bad equilibrium is never possi-
ble. Consequently, a single-agent direct revelation mechanism Γ( f ,P) satisfies the selective elimination
condition if and only if it has no bad equilibria at all and we obtain the following result:
Theorem 6. A social choice function f : Θ→ X in the single-agent scenario is strongly implementable if
and only if there exists an incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism Γ( f ,P) without bad equilibria.
We will now show how we can use Theorem 6 to decide Single-Agent Strong Implementability in
polynomial time. In the case of a single agent, a bad equilibrium in a direct revelation mechanism is
simply a strategy α : Θ → Θ of the agent such that α(θ) maximizes the utility of the agent for every
θ ∈ Θ and such that f (θ) 6= f (α(θ)) for at least one θ ∈ Θ. Hence, an incentive compatible direct
revelation mechanism Γ( f ,P) has no bad equilibrium if and only if we have
V ( f (θ ′),θ)+P(θ ′)<V ( f (θ),θ)+P(θ)
for all θ ,θ ′ ∈ Θ with f (θ) 6= f (θ ′). This implies that the possible payment schemes P of an incentive
compatible direct revelation mechanism Γ( f ,P) satisfying the selective elimination condition correspond
to the solutions of the following system in the variables P(θ) for θ ∈ Θ:
V ( f (θ ′),θ)+P(θ ′) < V ( f (θ),θ)+P(θ) ∀θ ,θ ′ ∈ Θ with f (θ) 6= f (θ ′) (6)
V ( f ( ¯θ ),θ)+P( ¯θ ) ≤ V ( f (θ),θ)+P(θ) ∀θ , ¯θ ∈ Θ (7)
Here, the inequalities (7) encode incentive compatibility of the mechanism and, as discussed above, the
strict inequalities (6) encode that the mechanism has no bad equilibrium. The polyhedron P defined by
this system when all strict inequalities are replaced by non-strict inequalities has polynomial facet com-
plexity, since the system only contains polynomially many variables (and inequalities) and coefficients
of polynomial encoding length. Thus, we can check in polynomial time whether the polyhedron contains
a relative interior point corresponding to a solution of the original system with strict inequalities in (6).
Hence, we obtain the following result:
Theorem 7. Single-Agent Strong Implementability ∈ P.
In fact, the above system shows that Single-Agent Strong Implementability can be decided via linear
programming.
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